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Honorable Willie Brown, Jr.
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol, West Wing-Room 209
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Enclosed herewith is the first in a series of reports by the
staff of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee on California
Corrections. The purpose of this report is to provide members
of the Assembly with a brief overview of the problems confronting
the Department of Corrections in the coming years with particular
emphasis on the fiscal needs of the prison system.
This report is primarily the work of Lewis H. Fudge, a former chief
institutional planner for the Department of Corrections with
more than twenty-five years experience in corrections, and Jeffrey
P. Ruch, a committee consultant.
I also wish to thank the Director,
Ruth Rushen, and the California Department of Corrections for their
cooperation in the preparation of the report.
In my judgment, the report findings highlight problems which are of
great importance, not only for the Department of Corrections, but
for all Californians who are concerned with the future of our
criminal justice system.
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FINDINGS

I.

The California Department of Corrections (CDC) is facing
workload, funding, and operational problems of monumental proportions:
1.

CDC Is Experiencing A Population Explosion.
Since the advent of the Determinate Sentencing Law in 1977, CDC
population has increased by over 7,000 prisoners (20,629 to
27,651).

During 1981, the prison population has grown at a

rate of 100 persons a week.

CDC is now projecting that the

prison population will accelerate to 39,787 by 1984-85 and may
reach 46,564 during 1989-90.
TABLE ONE
CDC TENTATIVE REVISED POPULATION ESTIMATES
July 23, 1981
As of June 30 of Fiscal Year

Total

1980-81

27,210

1981-82

30,605

1982-83

34,505

1983-84

37,626

1984-85

39,797

1985-86

40,784

1986-87

42,626

1987-88

43,906

1988-89

45,556

1989-90

46,564

1
2

1while these are CDC totals (male, female, felon and
non-felon) , only male felon figures were recalculated.
2Actual.
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2.

CDC Is Facing A Housing Crunch
Despite spending five years and millions of dollars in planning
for additional prisons, none of these prooosed institutions is
under construction.

In fact, prison bed capacity has actually

declined over the last 10 years.

The CDC is several years

behind in meeting housing needs that were forecast as early
as 1976.
The CDC will require between 11 and 13 new prisons in order to
provide some 18,413 additional prison beds needed to house
projected inmate populations throuqh 1990.

Current cost

estimates for new prison facility construction ranges from
$40,000 a bed for minimum security (Level I) housing through
$100,000 a bed for maximum security (Level IV) housing.

Even

if a low general figure of $50,000 a bed for the total range of
needed housing is used as the multiplier, new construction costs
will approach $1 billion by 1990.

This figure does not include

the very substantial capital outlay costs that would be required
to renovate existing facilities.
Institution studies carried out during 1980 show that the
majority of existing correctional institutions do not meet
contemporary standards, as developed by the American Correctional
Association and other agencies.

On this basis, the 1980 CDC

Facilities Requirements Plan recommends the upgrading of existing
institutions and the provision of a number of new institutions,
at a total cost of $1.3 billion.

However, these estimates were

made on the basis of population projections which were much
smaller than the CDC is now forecasting.
-2-

3.

Annual CDC Support Costs Are Accelerating.
In fiscal year 1966-67 with a total of 28,140 inmates, the
CDC support budget was $96,580,903.

In fiscal 1981-82 with

a smaller prisoner workload (27,651), the CDC support budget
is $429,783,872.

Over the last five years, the CDC budget

grew 110% while the state's inflation rate for the same
period was 63.6%.
If support cost trends are projected forward in relation to
anticipated prison population growth, annual CDC support
costs will total $1.33 billion by fiscal year 1989-90.
Per capita inmate costs have more than doubled in the last
five years (from $6,237 per annum in 1975-76 to $13,087 per
annum in 1981-82).

At the current rate of growth, the cost

of maintaining a single prisoner for one year will reach
$25,526 by fiscal year 1989-90.
4.

The CDC Workforce Has Grown At A Faster Rate Than Inmate
Population.
CDC staff has increased from 6,924 in 1966-67 to 9,373 in
1981-82 despite a net decrease in inmate population over that
period of time.

Thus, for example, while inmate populations

plunged in 1972, and again in 1975, CDC staff was increasing.
During the last decade, CDC staff expanded by over 2,500
positions while inmate totals remained relatively constant
(27,055 inmates in 1970-71 versus 27,651 inmates in 1981-82)
(See Table Two] .
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If the CDC maintains present staffing ratios in response to
growing prisoner populations over the next decade, the CDC
workforce will reach 16,056 by 1989-90.
These workforce expansions have not been confined to the
institutional guardlines.

CDC "Central Office" administrative

staff has grown from 165 positions in 1971 to 356 positions
in 1981.
TABLE TWO
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
STAFFING AND COST COMPARISONS
1960 - 1981

Category Totals

l
I

I

!

1960-61

I

1970-71

1

5.

1981-82

+ or - Differenc
1960-81

24,233
8,327.8
$203,566,256
$ 5,714,592

26,976
9,373.4
$429,783,872
$ 32,292,671

+
6,366
+
5,557.4
+$394,293,276
+$ 31,638,180

i

I

Inmate
Population
Staff
Support
Ad01inistrative
Administration
Staff
Inmate to Staff
Ratios
SO Staff/
Pop
Folsom
Staff/Pop
CMF
Staff/Pop
Per Capita Costs

1975-76

I
20,610
3,816
$35,490,596
644,491
s
101.3
4 to 1 CMF
6.9 to 1 Fol
562.4

4832
390.3
2700
487

I

164.4

231.4

372

3.6 to 1
508.7
575.9

1,600

3.5 to 1
884.8

m
522.6

'3';641

398.1

!940

s

27,055
6,852
$117,169,777
1,855,948
s

1';'TDO
$

2,056
729.2

6,237

$

270.7

+ 2.25 to 1
+ 322.4

- I7'00

2,TI3

IT70

+

13,087

+ 132.3
-~
+ 242.2
+4-n---$ 11,487

CDC Institutional Security Is Deteriorating.
Despite increased staffing, inmate violence and disruption has
steadily grown.

Fifteen CDC staff members have been murdered by

inmates since 1970.

During this same period, there have been

218 fatal assaults by prisoners compared to 88 during the prior
decade.

Serious incidents have increased from 366 in 1970 to

2,848 in 1980.

Assaults on staff by inmates have skyrocketed

from 59 during 1970 to 303 during 1980.
lockdowns have become commonplace in CDC.
-4-

Protracted and expensive

TP.BLE THREE
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS BY

IN~·~TES

ON STAFF

1970 - 1980

Nu~ber

CaJendar
year

1970
1971
.1972
1973
1974

······••··•••
···•······•••
......•...•••
·········••••
·•·•···•··•••

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

······•··•·••
·····•·····••
...•......•••
··········•••
·······•···••
......•..•.••

.

of assaults

-~

Total

59

67

55
84

93
65

Co=itted by
men

CocC'..iHed by
..-;J.-:len

57
64
51
78
83

~
10B

2
3
4

74

10

132
131

7

104

6

.

323'

170
311

18
2
12
12

.303

281

22

94

110
182

Total number
of staff
involved

]Be
84

..

1JJ
149
231
401

405

-

.

Note:

6.

These data are based upon incident reports sut~itted by the_institu:ions to Off~nder Inf?r~at:on
Services. Due to reporting irregularities, to!al assaults ~ 1973 1ncluded a d1sproport1onately
high mr..t-er of 1 ess serious incidents.

Chronic Prisoner Idleness Has Not Been Remedied.
Despite annual statements that expansion of prisoner work programs
is a matter of high priority, there has been no substantial increase
in such programs.

Approximately 10% of the current inmate popu-

lation is employed in correctional industries.
7.

CDC Has Failed To Adjust Its Goals And Methods To Changed
Circumstances.
Although rehabilitation is no longer a primary purpose of
imprisonment since the repeal of indeterminate sentencing,
-5-

CDC continues to retain rehabilitation-oriented staff
classifications and inmate programs.
At the same time, CDC has increasingly resorted to high cost,
high security lockdown units in its attempts to control
inmate violence and disruption.
California Corrections has experienced a steady decline in
cost and program effectiveness over the last decade.

CDC

shows no sign of reversing this trend over the corning decade.

-6-

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

"Life can only be understood backwards;
but it must be lived forwards."
Kierkegaard

While state prisons have existed in California since 1852,
it was not until 1944 that the prisons were organized into a statewide correctional network.

In that year the Legislature created the

present Department of Corrections and the then Board of Prison Terms.
Richard A. McGee, a career penologist of national reputation, was
recruited to become the state's first Director of Corrections.
McGee's appointment came at a time when the State of
California was receptive to the reform and reorganization of its
scattered prisons.

Starting with the archaic, often corrupt, and

usually brutal prisons of San Quentin and Folsom, McGee developed
the new Department of Corrections into a highly regarded correctional
organization.

This network of prisons was based upon the indeter-

minate sentence, professional level classification, and extensive
rehabilitation programs.

These features, together with "state of

the art" correctional management techniques, were intended to
effectively rehabilitate a rapidly expanding inmate population.
This was considered the "Golden Age" of California Corrections.
Staff and inmates generally accepted the changed prison social order.
The CDC was provided with modern institutions, professional staff,
and inmates who, for the most part, accepted correctional leadership,
the rehabilitative purpose, and the "medical model" techniques.
-7-

By the ear

1960's, CDC's "classic" era began to erode.

A long chain of events transpired which led the Department to its
present straits.
1.

Changing Prisoner Attitudes.
Two simultaneous and related changes signaled the beginning of
the end of what was considered a model prison system.

First was

the growing number of inmates who rejected correctional rehabilitation, as then practiced, together with its humanistic artifacts.
The second change, a growing number of assertive black prisoners,
drew far more notice by prison staff.

This new phenomenon was

most dramatically manifested by the emergence of the Black Muslim
movement in California prisons.
Prior to their appearance, the CDC, like most prison systems,
effected prisoner control with divide and conquer techniques.
This incorporated the extensive use of inmate informers -- "the
snitch system" -- and an official policy of each prisoner being
given individual attention and treatment
number system."

"the do your own

Prisoners who joined the Nation of Islam

confounded these control techniques.

The Muslims organized

themselves into disciplined groups which were capable of
collective action.
CDC staff were alarmed at these developments.

Black Muslims

were harassed and routinely placed in segregation lockup.

The

Muslims went to court seeking constitutional protection for the
exercise of their religious practices in prison.
responded in In re Ferguson, 361 P.2d 417
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The courts

(1961), and related

decisions which

ic First

religious safe-

guards to incarcerated Black Muslims.
Grudgingly, the CDC prison staff sanctioned the legitimacy of
the Black Muslims.

With the passage of time, the organization

proved to be a generally positive influence upon its members and
upon institution operations.

However, line staff continued to

resent and fear the organization.
change.

They were a symbol of unwanted

It was not until the late 1970's that the Muslims were

permitted to use institution chapel complexes for office space
and religious services or were provided with regular visits by
outside ministers from the Nation of Islam.
2.

Court Intervention and the End of Administrative Discretion.
Up until the present generation, the courts were generally
reluctant to intervene into the affairs of prisons or their
inmates.

This traditional "Hands Off" doctrine was best expressed

in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 VA (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871):
"A convicted felon as a consequence of his
crime not only forfeited his liberty, but
all his personal rights except those which
the law in its humanity accords to him.

He

is for the time being the slave of the state."
Beginning in the 1960's and extending up to the present a series
of court decisions gave prisoners legal rights which were
previously unrecognized.

The courts applied due process pro-

tections to the imposition of prison discipline (see Wolff v.
Me Donnell, 488 U.S. 539 [1974]), freedom of expression rights
-9-

to inmate correspondence (See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 [1974]), and Sixth Amendment access rights to legal services
and law libraries (See Fostre v. McGuinis, 442 F.2d 178 [1971],
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 [1972]).
Perhaps the most dramatic and direct judicial interventions
revolved around prison conditions themselves.

In the landmark

case of Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (1966), unsanitary
conditions and operational practices in Soledad Prison's Isolation
Cells were held to be unnecessarily punitive and violative of the
Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
Since Jordan, entire state prison systems have been found unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment standards.
The cumulative effect of these decisions has been to restrict the
administrative discretion vested in prison officials.
warden to the guard, all penal staff were affected.

From the
Although not

in an enviable position, the prisoner was no longer "the slave of
the state."

As with another emancipation proclamation, the

subsequent reconstruction period has been slow and painful.
The CDC attempted to change its practices to mesh with the
continuing series of court actions, but without uniform success.
The resistance of prison staff, naturally enough, was fiercest
where court decisions limited or eliminated management tools for
the control of inmates.

With the advent of determinate sentencing

and automatic "good time," prison officials lost even the ability
to meaningfully affect the release date of most inmates.
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New management

s have

s

to fill the void left

after the demise of the Hands Off Doctrine.
3.

Population and Policy Changes.
In 1967, following the election of Ronald Reagan as California's
Governor, Richard A. McGee was removed as Secretary of the Youth
and Correctional Agency and Walter Dunbar, who had succeeded
McGee as Director, was also replaced.

Governor Reagan later

abolished the Youth and Correctional Agency and placed both the
CDC and Youth Authority under the general guidance of the sprawling
Health and Welfare Agency.

Raymond Procunier, a career prison

administrator, was appointed CDC Director.

These changes were to

profoundly alter the effectiveness of the CDC during the years
ahead.
Two concurrent policy decisions by the Reagan Administration were
to prove equally significant.

First, probation subsidy legis-

lation of 1965 was given maximum support.

This legislation

encouraged individual counties, through money grants, to
substantially reduce the number of convicted felons sent to the
state prison system.

Because of probation subsidy, the percentage

of felons sent to the CDC from the counties declined from about
21% up to 1966 to 10% or less during 1969, 1970 and 1971.
Second, and directly related to probation subsidy, a proqram of
early prisoner releases was undertaken by the Adult Authority.
The result was a precipitous drop in the CDC population.

Dating

from 1969 the inmate population declined from an all time high
of 28,795 to only 19,088 three years later.
-11-

Initially

the

workload would

ease the CDC's growing management difficulties.
be the case.

This was not to

Instead, the prison system, so carefully structured

during the era of Richard McGee, was thrown badly out of balance.
The sudden exodus of conforming inmates shattered

traditionally

stabilizing prison sub-culture, which sought peaceful accommodation
with the formal management system.

The CDC was forced to close or

reduce a number of correctional facilities, and the standard
practice of double celling was ended.

This led to the present

severe bed shortage with which the CDC is now struggling.
Already sorely afflicted by changing social attitudes, by frequent
court interventions, by an abrupt change of administrative leadership, and by a suddenly reduced inmate population of radically
changed composition, CDC Director Ray Procunier attempted to chart
a new course for the system.

Procunier discarded much of the

planning and structure of the department under McGee.
regulations were substantially liberalized.
training manuals became outdated.
encouraged.

Rules and

Administrative and

Inmate organizations were

San Quentin inmates coalesced to hold "Unity Day"

strikes.
The changes proved to be too much and too fast for CDC.
close knit staff relationships unraveled.

Former

An exodus of career

executives from CDC began and continued through the regime of
Procunier's successor, Jeri Enomoto.

Even more damaging to the

system, a large number of capable middle managers and senior
guardline supervisors retired from or quit the CDC.
-12-

(Several of

these departing California prison officials have gone on to head
prisons and correctional systems in other states.)

Alienation

of line staff from the CDC "central office" set in and the
resulting staff morale problems are still with us.
4.

The Rise of Inmate Gangs and the Resurgence of Security Controls.
As an underground complement to the authorized self-help organizations, a growing variety of inmate tips, cliques and gangs
began to proliferate.

The Mexican Mafia was the first of these

convict gangs to gain department-wide notoriety.

Somewhat later,

the Black Guerrilla Family, the Nuestra Familia and the Aryan
Brothers began to vie for prison dominance.

With the formation

of these violence prone and predatory gangs -- brown, black
and white -- a formal structure of racial separation began in
prison operations.
Although each of these prison gangs contributed to the further
disruption of CDC institutions, it was the Black Guerrilla
Family (BGF) which proved to be the most threatening and
dangerous to line staff.

At Soledad prison on January 13, 1970,

there occurred a tragic and consequence-laden incident.

"A gun

tower guard rapidly fired several shots into a group of
Adjustment Center prisoners, who were fighting during their
brief exercise period, and he killed three black prisoners.

A

two year period of extreme violence between prisoners (mostly
black) and guards followed"

(Irwin, 1980:89-90).

During the prior decade a total of two CDC officers had been
murdered by inmates.

In the decade of the 1970's, however,
-13-

13 staff were

lled by inmates, primarily by black gangs.

This

epidemic of line staff murders reached its height in August 1971
when the black revolutionary convict George Jackson smuggled a
gun into the San Quentin Adjustment Center and gained control of
this high security, lockdown unit.

In the blood bath that

followed, three prison quards were murdered and several others
were left for dead.
murdered.

Two white inmate unit workers were also

George Jackson was killed as he fled from the unit.

Upon taking over the Adjustment Center, George Jackson stated,
"The black dragon has come to San Quentin."

In fact, Jackson's

black dragon spread far beyond the walls of San Quentin and
permeated the entire Department of Corrections.

Badly shaken

by what had occurred, and at guardline insistence, the CDC began
to embroider its rehabilitative programs with increased custodial
controls.

Post assignment schedules were lengthened to accom-

modate more and more uniformed officers.
But staffing increases and more stringent security controls did
not restore control or order.

Instead, they appeared to aggra-

vate the problem as inmate violence against staff and other
inmates accelerated during the next ten years.

Despite this

graphic evidence of failure, the CDC continued to employ more
and more staff to incapacitate a growing percentage of inmates
in high cost, high security, lockdown units.
At the same time, CDC left in place the program artifacts of
medical model rehabilitation and continued to liberalize the
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rules and regulations governing inmate discipline, correspondence,
To the

visiting, personal property, and program accountability.

growing frustration of line staff, the CDC administration appeared
to be pursuing policies which were in direct conflict with each
other.

TABLE FOUR
NUMBER AND TYPE OF INCIDENTS
Summary By Year
1970 - 1980

I n c i,d c n t a

.

T1 pc of ir.cideni

Plu::-.ber

Calendar
year

,
Ra i.e

per 100

:rotal
inc irlenh

average
inst.
pop •

Assau1 t
with

Poss.
of
"'tap on

Fights·

.

"'c~pon•

.
NAr-

Sex

Suicide

ao

15

11

26

103

lOS

14

H

36

cot ics

OU.cr

.
1970

.................

366

1.36

]9

'66

1971

................

us

2.00

124

~.9

1972

.................

592

3.0,

18.9

69

132

lU

9

9

.(0

1973 ~··············

717

3.57

197

92

200

230

4

18

36

197(

•............••

1,022

4.30

220

121

262

347

8

H

50

1975

············-··

1,089

lt.73

212

110

2'19

1;30

13

1976 ••·•••··•••••••

1,385

6.Bif

201f

131

193

776

6

1977 •••.••..••••••••

1 ,81.5

8.]3

241

177

302

951

16

1978 •••••• ; ••••••••

2,050

10.07

270

247

371,

1,0~

1979

..........•..••.

2,427

10.90

309

389-

420

'~980

•••......••••••

2,648

12.17

339

436

498

.

.

89.

.

.

9

66

7

68

12

116

18

..

113

1,099

''5)

8

17?

1,367

~2

11

17.5

.

.

•Includes fc~l in=idents.
••Includes (1; less st:rious attacks on staff by men (throo..ing cold liq;.:ic!, food or cards). Due to reporting
irrf'~u1arities, io~al fights this year included a disproportionately high nu:c;ber of less ~rious inddents
r:ote: These c!ate. E>.re b2.!>ed upon in=i dent reports subr.;i Hed by the insti t.A ions to Offender lnfor::-.ati on Ser.n ces.
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TABLE FIVE
NUMBER OF PERSONS FATALLY INJURED DUE TO ASSAULTIVE INCIDENTS
By Year
1960 - 1980

I nrnates

Total

Cahn~r

yf!ar

19&0
19&"1
1 96:?
1963
19&4
"1965
19&6
1967
1966
1969
1970
19n
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
19n
1976

Total

•••••••••••

•····•··•••
•••••••••••
•••••••••••

.4

8
8
8

·•·····•··•

5
"10

·········••
•••••••••••

4

•••••••••••

··········•
·····•··•••

10
"16
15
13
24
36
20
23
17
20
18
16
16

1380 ............

14

............
............
•••••••••••

...........
•···••···••

••.••••.•••

............
•••••••••••
•••••••••••

1979 ···········•
l<ote:

Stabbed

4
8
8
1

1
14
12
1
13

--1
1
-2
-2

32

1

4
6
6

5
1

9
4
10
16
15
11
17
35
19

3

23

17
19

18
16

15
20
15
17
16
13

1
2

Strangled

13

-

-

1

1
1

15

i

j

1

1

5

16
13

Beaten

Staff

1

Shot

-- I ----

----

2

1

-1
1

-2
2

1
1

1

2

-

-1
1
--2

-----

1
1

2'

1

1

-3
2'

--

1

1
1

-

Stabbed

Po honed

I

1
1
1

--- I
- I

--

1

-

1

I

In 1972, one officer fatally shot outside institution during the esczpe of in-~te enroute to court and one officer
blu::':;eoned fatally in 1976. lnr..ates fatally shot while aHer..pting to escape: 1 each in 1965, 1966, 1967 1 1971
and 1973.

5.

Determinate Sentencing.
In mid-1977 the sixty-year-old Indeterminate Sentencing Law (IDL)
was replaced by Determinate Sentencing (DSL) .
initially hailed as a sweeping reform measure.

The DSL was
Arbitrary and

capricious policies of the Adult Authority under IDL would be
eliminated.

The majority of inmates from the onset of sentencing

would know exactly how long they were to spend in prison.
Sentencing parity would be achieved.

-16-

But there proved to be a reverse side to this reform measure.
Each year since its passage there have been enhancements to the
original DSL penalties.

As the 1980 CDC Determinate Sentencing

report commented:
"The sheer existence of a system of fixed
penalties subject to legislative amendment
may make the system perpetually vulnerable
to pressures for increasing penalties or
extending their range."
The DSL might better have been termed a mandatory sentencing law.
Since its inception, the percentage of convicted felons sent to
state prisons has sharply increased.

Spurred forward by a rapidly

increasing crime rate, the DSL has resulted in an incarceration
rate in California of 91.5 per 100,000 of the state's population
in the age group 18 to 49 with CDC projecting that the rate will
rise to 116.12 per 100,000 by 1983 and continue during subsequent
years.

The current rate is already higher than any other

industrial nation with the exception of South Africa and the
Soviet Union.
The consequence for CDC of rising incarceration rates with ever
longer terms of commitment is severe overcrowding without the
IDL relief valve of mass parole.
The CDC had begun forecasting future population workloads since
1976 but it was not until 1980 that CDC fully realized the
magnitude of the problem.

The 1977 CDC Analysis of Programs

and New Facilities Proposal was the first concerted effort to
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deal with the realities of the situation, but was rejected by
the prison administration" . . . as not being anything close to
a statement of CDC policy, philosophy or direction"
1977:1) and suppressed.

(Walters,

Nevertheless, over the past five years

the CDC has piecemeal and grudgingly accepted the majority of
findings and proposals contained in the 1977 proposal.
The CDC is now pushing hard for the full implementation of its
1980 Facilities Requirements Master Plan.

Architectural drawings

are being finalized for a new and controversial 1000 bed maximum
security complex at Tehachapi.

Actual construction is expected

to begin by mid-1982.
Conservation camps and community release facilities are now
being expanded and increased in number as a result of recommendations of the State Legislature's 1980 Citizens Advisory
Committee on Alternatives to Incarceration.
been resumed on a department-wide basis.

Double celling has

Temporary satelite

units adjacent to five existing institutions are scheduled for
construction and occupancy during 1982-83.
Despite these measures, it is doubtful whether CDC's belated
expansion plans can match expected increases in prison
populations.
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CHART ONE

Department of Corrections Population
1950 - 1983

latest Projection
33,500 by
October 31. 1982

Highest
Population
28,795
Current
Population
26,014

Prison
Population
(thousands)
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III.

CONCLUSION

"Lost in our simplicity of times
the world abounds with laws,
and teems with crimes."
The Philadelphia Gazette (1775)

Corrections is the component of the criminal justice system
for which the Legislature has the most direct responsibility.

It

is, therefore, particularly important for legislators to understand
what is going on in our prison system.

This report is intended to

give a brief overview of California Corrections with S?ecial
emphasis on the fiscal aspects of the system.
The major challenge facing California Corrections over the
next decade will be to successfully cope with rising prison populations, growing inmate violence, a deteriorating physical plant,
newly-formed employee unions, and chronic prisoner idleness during
a time of severe fiscal constraints.

The present ability of

Corrections to meet this challenge is in serious doubt.

This

report is an attempt to explain why.
This report is the first in a series of five staff reports
from the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice.

Later reports

will focus on inmate work programs, prison staffing, facility
requirements, and correctional organization together with accompanying
recommendations.

-20-

After an examination of cost and population trends it
becomes apparent that Corrections will demand an even greater
portion of our public dollar in the years ahead.

Given that there

will be no shortage of competing social priorities for state
funding, it is incumbent upon policymakers to insure that California's
correctional system is as efficient and efficacious as possible.
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